The recovery from the 2008-9 recession has been much slower than the average recovery since the 1924 recession. As analysts who believe that the St. Louis model created by Leonall Andersen and Jerry Jordan still has relevance we believe that the slow rate of M2 growth since 2Q2009 is a major reason why GDP growth has been so slow. At the 9th Annual Missouri Economics Conference on March 27, 2009 we presented a paper, "Interwar Hoarding, Liquidity Traps, and the 2008 Solvency Trap" in which we recommended that the Federal Reserve attempt to maintain a 10% growth rate for M2 (or a growth rate of 6.80% on an inflation adjusted basis similar to the 1960, 1970, 1982 recoveries) with the hope that the plan would lead to a real GDP growth rate of 7% with an inflation rate of 3%. The title of that paper indicates two other factors hindering both M2 and GDP growth. Bank hoarding of excess reserves far in excess of ratios seen in the 1930s put the U.S. into a liquidity trap. But in 2008 this was not an ordinary trap. We tried to coin the term "solvency trap" to indicate our belief that, using mark to market accounting, the financial system was insolvent. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) have noted, recoveries from financial crises tend to be slower than those from ordinary recessions. Analyses of each downturn since 1922 are conducted along with what has happened after the economy bottomed in 2Q09 including money supply analysis. Three years have passed. We continue to believe our original recommendation was correct.
INTRODUCTION
As monetarists influenced by Milton Friedman, Karl Brunner, and Allan Meltzer we believe that the growth rate of the money stock can have significant effects on the economy. In 1968 Leonall Andersen and Jerry Jordan of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis started a significant economic debate with the publication of their reduced form model of the economy. Basically, it was a regression of GNP versus various fiscal and monetary measures. We do not wish to get into the Monetarist -Keynesian -Rational Expectations -Supply Side arguments but we note that Andersen and Jordan (1968) , Keran (1969) , Laffer and Ranson (1971) , etc. found that money stock explanators were very significant with t-statistics of 4 and up. Summary statistics are provided for the 15 recessions from 1924 through 2009.
Definitions: gGDP is the growth rate of real GDP for the year following the recession bottom; gM2 the growth rate of the M2 money stock; and gM2/P the growth rate of the real M2 money stock as estimated by M2 divided by the GDP deflator. Two regressions were run. The first is real GDP growth versus nominal M2.The result is Y = .501 X + 2.58, r 2 = .413, t = 3.015. In the second regression gM2 is replaced with gM2/P. The result is better with the regression being Y =.6177 X + 3.184, r 2 = .575, t = 4.194. In both cases 2Q09 -2Q10 M2 growth was substantially below the historical recovery average and so was GDP growth. Of course other factors affect GDP, fiscal policy, lags, the state of inventories and perhaps in 2001 the loss of wealth from the dot com stock market crash, the NASDAQ crash was truly spectacular.
Data Notes: Real GDP from the National Income and Product Accounts of the BEA. Interwar figures use NIPA with interpolations from Balke and Gordon (1986 ).M2 from FRED, 1924 to 1959 from Friedman (1970 .
LONGER RUN RESULTS
To find a longer run effect of money on recoveries we use a 3 year period which is what is available for 2Q09 to 2Q12, at this time. The sample is smaller because the 1924, 1927, 1958, and 1980 recessions run into the following downturn and 1949-52 runs into the Korean War. Recommendation note. The growth rates of real M2 for the 1960-63, 1970-73, and 1982-85 recessions averaged 6.56%, close to our 6.80% recommendation with real GDP growth rates averaging 5.36%.
There are three generalizations about recoveries that are of interest. The first is that faster M2 growth tends to cause a faster recovery from the evidence above. Because of the liquidity trap problem discussed below we believe the focus should be on the growth of M2 rather than the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet or the level of interest rates. The second is the Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) conclusion that recoveries after financial upheavals are generally slower than average and that it takes time to repair damaged balance sheets. The third expressed by Scott Sperling of Thomas Lee Partners on CNBC's August 22 program "Closing Bell" is that the deeper the recession the faster the recovery. Ex Reagan Treasury official Larry Kudlow now on CNBC takes delight in citing the fast recovery from the 1981-82 recession compared to the current slow recovery. gGDP = 3.76 + .467Decline; r 2 = .07, t = .83, n = 11, post WWII.
THE CURRENT RECOVERY VERSUS OTHERS
According to Sperling-Kudlow we should have had a sharp rebound post 2Q09 similar to the pattern of recovery after the sharp recessions of 1974-5 and 1981-2. But the rate of real M2 growth after those two recessions was far higher than 2Q09-2Q12. Given the relatively low rate of money growth after 2009 (either M version, either time period) the growth of post 2009 GDP would be expected to be lower than the historical averages. A second factor retarding the recovery is the Reinhart-Rogoff effect. A third factor in the three year result is that the trend of real M2 growth was, year by year: .74%, 3.68%, and 7.49%, averaging 3.94%. If there is a lagged effect it is possible that the effect of the recent 7.49% growth has not been felt yet.
We believe the 1933-36 recovery should have been the pattern for post 2Q09. The 1933-36 recovery was surprisingly strong given that the Great Depression downturn ended with a huge financial crisis, the final run on banks that caused newly inaugurated President Franklin Roosevelt to declare a bank holiday on March 6, 1933 as his first act as president. Given the severity of the financial crisis which caused the banking system to collapse the Reinhart-Rogoff observation would indicate a slow, painful recovery. It is suspected that Reinhart-Rogoff did not hold in 1933-36 for two reasons. First, whether by accident or not, the Fed did the correct thing (as opposed to standing by and allowing waves of bank failures from 4Q30 through March 1933) and let M2 expand at a high 12.94% nominal or 8.14% real rate.
A second reason is that in 1933 there was swift and true reform of the banking system which, except for the S&Ls -a separate category, was stable from 1933 to the 2006 real estate bubble and the change from the originate to hold loans model to the originate to securitize into CDOs model. More reform came on June 16, 1933 in the Banking Act of 1933. This act was done in 61 pages 102 days after the bank holiday. The 848 page Dodd-Frank Act was passed on July 21, 2010 and 25 months later rules are still being formulated. The Bank Act of 1933 established deposit insurance, separated commercial from investment banking (the Glass-Steagall provision), and established Regulation Q (ultimately a big mistake leading to disintermediation and credit crunches 36 years later). Today there still is argument about the form of the Volcker Rule and continuing concern with the moral hazard problem of "too big to fail". The cleanup and reforms of 1933 clearly were a success. We do not know about Dodd-Frank.
While the NBER classifies 2001 as a recession, it really is a flat spot. Here are the latest revised quarterly real GDP figures starting with the first top in 4Q00: 11325, 11288, 11362, 11330, and 11370 which ends it. The drops are trivial. The three year figures for the "recession" of 2001 are quite similar to that of the current recovery. A possible explanation for the sub-par growth of GDP is the low rate of growth of M2 compounded by the effects of the dot com stock market crash which sent the NASDAQ index from a peak of 5048 to a low of 1119.
There are two recoveries that do not fit the monetary pattern very well, 1954-7 and 1991-4. In both cases there was moderate GDP growth despite weak M2/P growth. In the 1991-4 period the real growth of M2 was -.75% annual rate but real GDP growth was 3.16%. A potential explanation could be an after effect of the first gulf war in 1990. After the "victory" oil prices dropped 36% from $20.55 to $13.23 per barrel which could have given a boost to the economy. Regarding 1954-7 we have no explanation at this time but need to rerun the original Andersen-Jordan study to examine the residuals for this period.
THE LIQUIDITY TRAP
We are surprised that virtually no one besides Paul Krugman has discussed the idea that we are in a liquidity trap and how to combat it. Here is Krugman's definition from Brad Delong's blog of Jan. 29, 2009: "I keep seeing economics articles that insist that we are NOT in a liquidity trap (and, of course, that yours truly is all wrong) because the situation doesn't meet the author's definition of such a trap e.g. the interest rates at which businesses can borrow are not zero: or that there are things the Fed could do, like buying long term bonds, or corporate debt, or something. Well, my definition of a liquidity trap is, purely and simply, a situation in which conventional monetary policy -open market purchases of short term debt has lost effectiveness. Period. End of story. Now, if you prefer a different definition of a liquidity trap, OK, call it a banana, instead. But changing the name..".
We have a simple quantitative method of measuring a trap. If conventional monetary policy has lost its effectiveness completely then an increase (or decrease) in the monetary base Ba has no effect on the money stock. This brings up the possibility of measuring a partial trap as mentioned in Carlson and Lackman (2009) . Suppose the base goes up 20% and the money stock goes up 20% (the money multiplier remaining constant). Then there is no trap. If the money stock does not go up at all then there is a 100% trap. And if the money stock goes up 3% then there is an 85% trap (15% getting through means 85% was trapped). Diane Swonk of Mesirow Financial on CNBC had an interesting description of a trap. Paraphrasing: The helicopters (the Fed) were dropping dollar bills but they were getting caught in the trees (kept by the banks as excess reserves) and not reaching the ground where the people could get them (increasing the money supply). M2 and Ba figures from FRED: ...1981 ... .150.......8.87........67.19 4Q10....8766.3....3.47....2009 ... .305..... -0.40…....untrap 1Q11....8921.4....5.10....2428 ... .222......15.27…...66.60 2Q11....9095.0....5.96....2671 ... .563......31.99.......81.37.. .. 3.96 25.21 84.29 3Q11....9478.2....9.68....2656 ... .623......34.09…...71.60 4Q11....9618.3....9.72....2603 ... .613......29.58.... ..79.58 1Q12....9814.2..10.01....2684 ... .348.. ...10.55.….. -5.12 2Q12....9944.4....9.34....2644 ... .757..... -1.00......untrap JULY..10020.9...9.63... 2669 The 2Q08-2Q09 Trap. During the Downturn. From 2Q08 to 2Q09 the base went up 97.25%, a record shattering rate of growth from the FRED chart which goes back to 1918. But M2 went up only 9.23%. The reason was that 90.51% of the base was trapped letting only 9.49% through. If a trap is perfect then the base can go to infinity without boosting M2. But if a trap is partial, even 90%, then it can be broken by a brute force increase in the base which is what the Fed did in 2Q08-2Q09 with QE-1.
The 2Q09-2Q11 Trap. Over tis two year period the base increased at a 25.21% rate. Encountering a trap rate averaging 84% the M2 growth rate was only 3.96%, the M2/P growth rate 2.20% and the real GDP growth rate also a disappointing 2.20%. On page 16 of our 2009 paper we recommended a growth rate of 175% for the base anticipating a trap rate of 94%. Given the actual trap rate of 84% that would have led to an M2 growth rate of 26%, obviously too high. But it could have been adjusted downward. We were too high but the actual path taken by the Fed was too low. The Fed finally recognized that growth was too low which is why there was a QE-2 and now talk of QE-3. In contrast we did not want a pause and wanted QE-1 to continue until the recovery was self-sustaining. So where are we now (late August 2012)?
Has the Trap Broken? As it turns out the trap may have broken. The 2Q2011 base was $2671.563 billion and the July 2012 level $2669.928 billion, virtually un-changed. Continuing with the Swonk analogy the helicopters stopped dropping dollars over the past year. But while the base has been constant M2 has grown from $9095.0 billion to $10021.1 billion June 2011 to July 2012, a 9.36% rate of growth. What has happened is that the dollars caught in the trees have finally started falling to the ground. Bank hoarding of excess reserves has dropped from $1588.7 billion to $1483.0 billion. $14.9 billion of that decrease went to an increase in required reserves and vault cash, the remainder to an increase in cash held by the public (Cp) which rose from $963.0 billion to $1051.4 billion. This kicked of the lending depositing process increasing both deposits and M2. Monetary statistics (from FRED) and the simple Brunner-Meltzer money stock formula show what happened. The money stock formula is; M2 = [1+k/k+re+rrvc] Ba where the term in brackets is the money multiplier; k is the currency/deposit ratio Cp/TDp, TDp is time plus demand deposits; re the excess reserve ratio Re/TDp; and rrvc is the required reserve and vault cash ratio (Rr+VC/TDp). Two definitions are M2 = Cp + TDp and Ba = Cp + Re + RrVC. Monetary data: 
